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1. Introduction 
The informal logician, analyzing an argument in natural language, senses an insufficiency or 
incompleteness of evidence advanced in support of the conclusion. Unable to proceed without 
estimating the importance of the lacuna, she scrutinizes the argument in its context - who 
advanced it when as part of what debate - to identify more precisely what is lacking. Finding 
this, she may then evaluate the argument as weak (the evidence falls seriously short) or strong 
(nothing vital missing) and go to the next item on her agenda. 
Our interest here is in those cases where the deficiency can be remedied by formulating what 
was missing as a premise and fitting it into its place in the argument. The justification for this 
step could be that the author assumed the reader would know it as part of general or common 
knowledge, and that the missing premise probably lay within the author's intent. Let us for now 
call the statement she has added to the explicit premises an implicit premise: it alone will be the 
focus of the following investigation. But before pursuing it we note that supplying an implicit 
premise does not itself complete the work of the argument analyst. She must still evaluate the 
now repaired argument as weak or strong. 
Some important problems of implicit premises (e.g. how to find them, and how to formulate 
them) will be touched on only in passing (the former) or not at all (the latter). The problem 
addressed here is the terminology used to describe them, chiefly but not only implicit premises. 
This terminology is important because it varies considerably from one writer to the next (and 
even in the same  writer), it has been little studied, and it may well influence our thinking about 
its referent. In particular I will focus on problems associated with the term implicit as descriptive 
of premises in the work of argument analysts, a usage in concluding I advise against. But I begin 
with a look at other descriptive terms. 
2. Variety of Terms 
A striking feature of the considerable literature on the implicit premise is the wealth of 
terminology employed to refer to it. Implicit premise is found in some teaching material 
(Dowden 1993: 252f.) as well as in investigations of assumptions ((Delin et al. 1994; Plumer 
1999). Unstated premise is found both in research (Burke 1985) and in textbooks (Copi & 
Burgess-Jackson 1996: 29). The Amsterdam School of Argumentation prefers unexpressed 
premises (Eemeren & Grootendorst 1982/83; Snoeck-Henkemans 1992: 28f.; Gerritsen 1991), 
although  others use this term too (Yanal 1998: 235ff.), and the Amsterdam School occasionally 
opts for tacit premise (Eemeren & Grootendorst 1982/83), or along with other writers, 
suppressed premise (Freeman 1988;  Eemeren & Grootendorst 1982/83; Fogelin 1991: 89). 
Missing premise is widely used (Copi & Burgess-Jackson 1996: 29; Walton  1996: 105), 
even by a writer who somewhat improbably advances an other-world semantics scheme to aid us 
in finding it (Donn 1990). Hitchcock (1983: 94) refers to the elusive premise as omitted as well 
as missing, and notes a problem common to much of this terminology: "in saying that an 
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argument has a missing (or unexpressed, or tacit, or unstated, or suppressed) premiss, we seem to 
be saying that an argument has a premiss which it does not have." Gough and Tindale  (1985: 
100) prefer hidden premise, which at least suggests that the concealed premise is there, 
terminology also favored by Grennan (1994) and Groarke (1997). Finally, some empirical work 
suggests that students more readily identify implicit major premises in syllogisms and premises 
in non-syllogistic arguments than they do minor premises in syllogisms (Eemeren et al. 1994). 
It isn't clear that unexpressed premise marks off some distinction not available to the 
Amsterdam School with other terminology. Hitchcock (1985), and Gough and Tindale (1985) 
would reserve missing premise for the shortcoming of an enthymeme (incomplete syllogism), 
and hidden premise for the case of interest  to informal logic. But other than this the wealth of 
vocabulary seems not to mark off distinctions helpful for understanding and communicating the 
function of the implicit premise in argument analysis in informal logic. 
Informal logicians confront a wide variety of argument in natural  language toward the 
understanding of which formal logic has contributed comparatively little, and their working 
vocabulary is  much influenced by the dominance of formal logic in the 20th century.  As a 
result, interpretations and adjustments are necessary to secure a terminology adequate to the task 
of argument analysis. Implicit (about which more below) does not appear to denote a relation in 
either logic, but the burden of explaining why it doesn't and what it nonetheless does denote 
presses more on the informal logician. She is more occupied with arguments of substance in 
natural language, where the arguers feel little responsibility to render all of their important 
premise material explicit. 
The descriptive phrase implicit premise would not be trouble free even if we had either an 
entirely satisfactory clarification of implicit or a substitute that would banish the problems. This 
is because premise means something quite different in formal and in informal logic. In formal 
logic, premise denotes a statement that must be true for the conclusion to be true. Should this 
statement turn out not to be needed for the conclusion to be true, then it is not a  premise. For the 
informal logician, premise denotes a statement advanced in support of a conclusion, but one 
whose falsity can be compatible with the truth of the conclusion. 
Such different understandings enhance the potential for miscommunication between formal 
and informal logician. For example, formal logicians balk at recognizing convergent arguments 
as arguments - in this type of argument each premise contributes a measure of separate, 
independent support, so it is possible for a conclusion to receive strong support from one or more 
independent  premises even when some other premise turns out to be false or irrelevant. Its being 
advanced by someone in support of a conclusion makes a statement a premise for informal logic; 
its being needed for a conclusion to be true makes one a premise for formal. 
3. Implicit Statements and Implications 
Though imply and implicit both descend from Latin implicare, current use has them some 
distance from their ancestor. When Aeneas rhetorically inquires of the Latins quaenam vos 
fortuna implicuit bello (Bk. XI, 108f.), what fate involved or entangled them in war, the ancient 
meaning is closer to today's implicate. For us it is clear that to be implicit is to be the opposite of 
explicit. From this it follows that to be an implication and to be implicit must  differ. For an 
implication can be explicit, and it does not seem possible for something to be both implicit and 
the opposite of implicit at the same time. 
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Let us explore this distinction briefly. When someone says in a menacing tone of voice "I 
wouldn't do that if I were you," we might say that there is a threat implicit in this counterfactual. 
On the other hand, when the foreman says "Do that and you will be docked a day's wages," it is 
not appropriate to say that the threat is implicit. In this case the threat is explicit - the statement 
itself is a threat - and the threat will not be both implicit and explicit at the same time. To be 
implicit is to be unstated, whereas to be explicit is to be stated, and a threat will not be both 
stated and unstated simultaneously. 
While a threat may be explicit or implicit, we do not describe an  implication in similar 
terms. To my knowledge phrases such as explicit implications and implicit implications are not 
used. We do, however, speak of one implication as unstated, then of another as explicitly drawn 
by the writer. Of this pair the unstated implication presents us with an epistemic problem. Given 
that it is unstated, how do we know that it is there - that it even exists? If someone claimed there 
was a coin in a fountain, and we looked long and hard from various vantage points and didn't see 
it, we might conclude that  there wasn't any coin there after all. Isn't the unstated implication 
analogous to the unseen coin - unperceived and hence not there? 
To be an implication is to be implied, and in the sense in which a text might have an 
unstated implication, to be implied is to be made true by the text. This lands us in the province of 
logic, which is concerned with cases where the truth or falsity of some statements affects the 
truth or falsity of others (Beardsley 1975: 48). As the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 
defines it, implication is "a relation that holds between two statements when the truth of the first 
ensures the truth of the second" (1995: 362). This explains how an implication relates logically 
to other statements in the text. But it falls short of fully addressing our current problem: since our 
implication is unstated, how do we even know that it is there, let alone specifically what it is, and 
that as such it is an implication? 
Logic does more than enable us to apprehend given statements and decide whether or not 
they stand in certain relations to each other. Given a text, the mind operating on it logically can 
generate new statements whose truth depends on those of the text, and these we call its 
implications. One can say that the new statements are deduced or drawn out of the text. This 
aspect is emphasized in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy definition of implication as "The relation 
that holds between two propositions when one is deducible from the other" (1967: V, 68). One 
can also say, with C.S. Peirce (1992: 111), that reasoning discloses "from the consideration of 
what we already know, something else which we do not know." The "something else" we just 
found out is the logical implication of "what we already know." 
4. Implicit Premises 
The problem with implicit as a modifier of premise when analyzing arguments is just this 
double duty it performs. It answers two different questions. First, why is this argument 
incomplete? There is a hidden, or unstated, or implicit premise. Second, how do we know what 
this unstated premise is? It is implied by the argument. The second question is where the trouble 
lies. At a minimum this response puts us at cross purposes with our analytical endeavor. Beyond 
that, it may not be the best description of the logical relation of the missing premise to the 
argument.  
Little has been written on the stance or approach of the argument analyst to the argument 
she is analyzing. In the real world we analyze arguments when their conclusions are of 
 
 
 
Implicit Premises  4 
 
consequence to us and we must rely on these conclusions for our beliefs or actions. If we had 
complete faith or trust in the claims of others, there would be no need to ask for reasons or 
evidence, and consequently there would be no need for arguments. If all reasons or evidence 
supported the  conclusions of arguments equally well, there would be no need to  analyze and 
evaluate these arguments. So argument analysis in the real world is doubly sceptical: first in 
doubting claims and demanding reasons or evidence to support them; second, in analyzing the 
reasons or evidence to determine whether it adequately supports the claim. Further, the 
scepticism of the real-world argument analyst is measured: whether to analyze a given argument, 
and if so, how far to pursue the analysis, will depend on the degree to which the claims  
supported are important for our beliefs or actions. 
This measured scepticism in the approach of the argument analyst is what is at cross 
purposes with the conception of the missing premise as implied by the argument. One task of 
analysis is to establish whether the explicit premises are reliable, or to simplify, whether they are 
true. We proceed on the hypothesis that they may be false until we establish them either true or 
false. Since the implicit premise isn't stated, we are able to identify it as a  premise only by its 
relation to explicit premises and conclusion. We seem to recognize the missing statement as a 
premise only because it is implied by one or more true explicit premises. (If an explicit premise 
were false, neither it nor what it implied would support the conclusion.) So we simultaneously 
entertain the proposition that the explicit premises are established as true and the proposition that 
the explicit premises are not established as true. Simultaneously entertaining contradictory 
propositions is a situation even we  informal logicians prefer to avoid. 
This situation is aggravated if we hold that the implicit premise is implied by the conclusion 
of the argument and some combination of explicit premises. We need a fortiori to suspend 
judgment on the truth of the conclusion, since the point of argument analysis in the broad sense 
is to establish whether the conclusion receives adequate support from these premises. This 
position lands us squarely in begging the question of the circular reasoning variety. We are 
holding that the conclusion must be true to identify the missing premise, and that the missing 
premise must be true to support the conclusion. 
5. Conclusion  
If we continue to speak of implicit premises in argument analysis, we should do so aware of 
its equivocal nature, its tendency to pre-judge the logical relation of a missing premise to its 
argument, and its tendency to tangle our analytical endeavor in logical snares. Given a number of 
other terms to refer to the missing premise that lack this equivocation and the unfortunate 
tendencies, we may be better off not referring to implicit premises in argument analysis at all. 
These other terms do involve the paradox noted by Hitchcock, but it doesn't hamper our 
analytical endeavor. For when we say that an argument has a missing premise, we are indeed 
claiming that it has a premise it doesn't have. It has a premise (a statement needed for the 
conclusion to receive prima facie adequate support) it doesn't have (the statement is not present 
among the expressed premises). 
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